We must always remember that there are real people involved in every legal case that we read. Sometimes this can be forgotten.
Take for example the recent case of a stillborn baby accidentally sent to a laundry in Texas.
Crenshaw v. Sarasota County Public Hosp. Bd.466 So.2d 427, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 880--------------------------------------------------------------------------
District Court of Appeal of Florida,Second District.
Sheryl CRENSHAW, Appellant,
v.
SARASOTA COUNTY PUBLIC HOSPITAL BOARD
a/k/a Sarasota Memorial Hospital
and Willie Williams, Appellees.
No. 81-2020.
April 3, 1985.
Mother of stillborn child whose body was mutilated
after being inadvertently placed with hospital's
laundry brought action for mental and emotional
distress.
The Circuit Court, Sarasota County, Frank T. Schaub,
J., dismissed complaint, and mother appealed.
The District Court of Appeal, Campbell, J., held
that:
(1)mother had no cause of action for mental distress,
and (2) she had no breach of contract action for
mental distress caused by alleged breach.
Affirmed.
Mother who did not see mutilated body of stillborn
child and was not involved in the events leading
to body's mutilation, except the birth itself, and
who did not suffer discernible physical injury as a
result of her psychological trauma, had no cause
of action against hospital for mental and emotional
distress suffered as a result of alleged negligence.
*428 Harold R. Busch; and James R. Dirmann of
Dirmann & Scott, Sarasota, for appellant.
Lewis F. Collins, Jr. of Dickinson, O'Riorden,
Gibbons, Quale, Shields & Carlton, P.A., Sarasota,
for appellees.
CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appellant, Sheryl Crenshaw, seeks review of the
final order dismissing her amended complaint against
appellees, Sarasota County Hospital Board, also
known as Sarasota Memorial Hospital, and Willie
Williams.
In September 1977, appellant delivered, at thirty
-two weeks, a stillborn child. The child's body was
wrapped in a green linen sheet and taken to the
hospital morgue. Shortly after the body arrived
at the morgue, it was placed in a laundry bin
and taken to a commercial laundry. Several days
later, the child's body was discovered in a
commercial washing machine mutilated from the
action of the machine. Appellant apparently
never saw the child.
Appellant filed suit to recover damages for
the purely mental and emotional distress she
suffered as a result of the negligence of appellees.
Appellees argued that there is no cause of action
for emotional distress absent physical contact
or impact to appellant.
At the suggestion of the parties, this case was
stayed pending the outcome of Champion v. Gray,
No. 62,830, (Fla. Mar. 7, 1985) [10 FLW 164]. In
Champion, the court addressed the certified question:
"Should Florida abrogate the 'Impact Rule' and
allow recovery for the physical consequences
resulting from mental or emotional stress caused
by the defendant's negligence in the absence of
physical impact upon the plaintiff?"
To a limited extent, the court answered the
question in the affirmative. However, the outcome
of Champion provides no relief to appellant.
In Champion, the complaint alleged that a
drunk driver ran off the road striking and
killing Karen Champion. Her mother, Joyce Champion
heard the accident and immediately went to the scene.
Upon seeing her daughter's body, Joyce Champion
collapsed and died.
The Florida Supreme Court found these allegations
stated a cause of action.
The court stated:
[T]he price of death or significant discernible
physical injury, when caused by psychological
trauma resulting from a negligent injury imposed
upon a close family member within the sensory
perception of the physically injured person, is
too great a harm to require direct physical
contact before a cause of action exists.
We emphasize the requirement that a causally
connected clearly discernible physical impairment
must accompany or occur within a short time of the
psychic injury.
Further, the court noted that the psychically
injured party should be "directly *429 involved
in the event causing the original injury. If such
a person sees it, hears it, or arrives on the scene
while the injured party is still there that person
is likely involved." Champion, 10 FLW 160, 166.
In Brown v. Cadillac Motor Car Division,
468 So.2d 903 (Fla. 1985), the court stated that
Champion does not abolish the requirement that a
demonstrable physical injury must flow from the
accident before a cause of action exists.
"We hold there is no cause of action for
psychological trauma alone when resulting from
simple negligence."
[1] Here, appellant did not allege that she
saw the mutilated body or that she was involved
in the event, except for the birth of the stillborn
child, in any way. Nor did she allege that
she suffered a discernible physical injury as a
result of her psychological trauma. Thus,
appellant did not allege a cause of action
under the requirements of Champion.
[2] Appellant also sought recovery on the basis
that appellees' negligent breach of their contract
caused appellantmental and emotional distress.
We do not believe there may be recovery for
mental distress caused by a breach of contract
in the absence of an independent willful tort.
Gellert v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 370 So.2d 802
(Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 381 So.2d 766
(Fla.1980); cf. Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So.2d 188
(Fla.1950).
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the
dismissal of appellant's amended complaint.
RYDER, C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.
West Headnotes
[1] Damages 115 k 57.28
115 Damages
115III Grounds and Subjects of Compensatory Damages
115III(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or Prospective
Consequences or
Losses
115III(A)2 Mental Suffering and Emotional Distress
115k57.26 Injury or Threat to Another; Bystanders
115k57.28 k. In Utero and Childbirth. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 115k56.20, 115k51)
[2] Damages 115 k 57.42
115 Damages
115III Grounds and Subjects of Compensatory Damages
115III(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or Prospective
Consequences or
Losses
115III(A)2 Mental Suffering and Emotional Distress
115k57.41 Breach of Contract or Warranty
115k57.42 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 115k56)
There is no recovery for mental distress caused by breach of contract
in the
absence of an independent willful tort.
